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A B S T R A C T
The energy sector plays a signiﬁcant role in reaching the ambitious climate policy target of limiting the global tem-
perature increase to well below 2 °C. To this end, technological change has to be redirected and accelerated in the
direction of zero-carbon solutions. Given the urgency and magnitude of the climate change challenge it has been argued
that this calls for a policy mix which simultaneously supports low-carbon solutions and also deliberately drives the
discontinuation of the established technological regime. Yet, the eﬀect of such phase-out policies on the development and
diﬀusion of low-carbon technologies has received little attention in empirical research so far. This paper addresses this gap
by taking the case of the transition of the German electricity system towards renewable energies – the so-called
Energiewende. Based on a survey of innovation activities of German manufacturers of renewable power generation
technologies conducted in 2014 it explores the impact such destabilization policies –most prominently Germany’s nuclear
phase-out policy – may have on technological change in renewable energies. By drawing on descriptive statistics and
combining insights from earlier regression analyses we ﬁnd evidence that Germany’s nuclear phase-out policy had a
positive inﬂuence on manufacturers’ innovation expenditures for renewable energies and was seen as the by far most
inﬂuential policy instrument for the further expansion of renewable energies in Germany. The insights resulting from our
explorative analysis have important implications for the literature on policy mixes and sustainability transitions regarding
the ‘ﬂip sides’ to innovation and the crucial importance of destabilization policies for unleashing ‘destructive creation’. We
close by discussing policy repercussions for ongoing debates on policies for accelerating the phase-out of coal to meet
climate change targets.
1. Introduction
The energy sector plays a signiﬁcant role in reaching the ambitious
climate policy target of limiting the global temperature increase to well
below 2 °C, as agreed at COP21 in Paris [1]. To this end, technological
change has to be redirected and accelerated in the direction of zero-carbon
solutions for which policies play a key role [2–5]. More precisely, the ex-
istence of various market and system failures calls for policy mixes in-
cluding demand pull, technology push and systemic instruments [6–9]. In
addition, it has increasingly been pointed out that policy mixes should not
only include instruments promoting green niche innovations, such as re-
newable energies, but that in addition such mixes should also target the
destabilization of established regimes [10,11].
The literature on sustainability transitions [12] has considered this ‘ﬂip
side’ to innovation in the form of ‘destabilization’ of technological regimes
[13,14]. More recently, attention has also been given to the ‘discontinuation’
processes aiming at the phase-out of certain technological trajectories
[15–17]. In addition, literatures related to overcoming ‘lock in’ and
incumbency in socio-technical transitions have addressed this phenomenon
[18–20]. These contributions are typically based on historical case studies
analyzing the diﬀerent inﬂuencing factors that lead up to a particular
‘window of opportunity’ where a discontinuation policy is realised, oﬀering
preliminary insights into the understudied areas of deliberate destabilization
and technological discontinuation. Yet, the eﬀect of such destabilization po-
licies on the development and diﬀusion of green alternatives has received
limited attention in empirical research so far.
Research on discontinuation is timely, with discontinuation policies
emerging across the energy policy landscape. In the wake of the Fukushima
accident and signiﬁcant long-standing problems regarding cost overruns and
ﬁnancing in the nuclear sector, several countries besides the famous case of
Germany are also implementing nuclear phase out policies including
Belgium, Scotland, Switzerland, Taiwan, and South Korea [21,22]. In the
context of the perceived need to ‘accelerate’ transitions [23], the phase out of
coal is also becoming a prominent policy objective, for example with the UK,
the Netherlands, and Quebec among countries and regions proposing such
policies [24–26]. Phase out policies are also taking place in the transport
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sector, e.g. with Norway proposing to phase out petrol and diesel cars by
2025 [27]. Yet, despite the relevance of phase out policies in sustainability
transitions, so-called ‘ﬂip sides’ to innovation [14], including destabilization
and discontinuation, remain under-studied.
In this paper we address this knowledge gap using the case of the tran-
sition of the German electricity generation system towards renewable en-
ergies – the so-called Energiewende [28–30]. We have chosen this example
because it represents a sustainability transition governed by a policy mix
which not only includes policies supporting renewable energies but also de-
stabilization policies – most prominently the nuclear phase-out policy set for
completion in 2022 [31–33]. Our explorative analysis adds to existing em-
pirical studies which have focused on the economic and technical assessments
of the impacts of the nuclear phase out for energy systems [34–40]. Given
that the power sector has traditionally been a supplier dominated sector [41]
we draw on ﬁndings of a survey of innovation activities of German manu-
facturers in renewable power generation technologies. By combining de-
scriptive statistics and insights of earlier regression analysis [42,43] we ex-
plore the impact of the nuclear phase-out policy – as an example of a decisive
discontinuation policy with a history of more than ten years – on the de-
velopment and diﬀusion of renewable energies. Understanding the eﬀects of
the nuclear phase out in Germany on technological change has international
policy relevance in terms of providing insights for the increasing number of
countries considering phase out policies to accelerate the decarbonization of
their energy system.
In the remainder of the paper, we brieﬂy summarize the literature
on destabilization / discontinuation policies (Section 2), and then de-
scribe the research case (Section 3) and methodology (Section 4). In the
main part of the paper we present the results of our exploration of the
impact of the German nuclear phase-out policy on technological change
in renewable energies (Section 5). We close with a discussion of the
theoretical, methodological and policy implications for the governance
of the decarbonisation of energy systems (Section 6).
2. Literature review
“Discontinuous change” is a core concept in innovation studies [44,45],
where technological change occurs in waves of ‘creative destruction’ in which
old technologies are replaced by the new [46]. While the end stage of a
technology’s life is recognized within this framing this is usually encapsulated
as a consequence of the disruptive force of new technologies and business
models rather than discontinuation being driven by policy. Typically, this
literature has been limited to discontinuity in terms of speciﬁc ﬁrms or actors
[47]. In contrast, there has been some work in policy studies focused on
‘policy termination’ and ‘policy dismantling’ [48,49], but this literature tends
to look at termination in relation to the withdrawal of funding for certain
policy initiatives, rather than from the perspective of broader technological
systems. That is, little has been written concerning broader policy processes
related to the ending of certain technological trajectories [16,50].
While the broader literature on sustainability transitions includes ‘desta-
bilization’ of dominant (and unsustainable) ‘socio-technical regimes’ as a key
concept, this has usually been encapsulated as resulting from the emergence,
protection and diﬀusion of new niche-based sustainable technologies or in-
novations [51,52]. However, there has been increasing attention to the ways
in which the dynamics and stability of the regime level curtail sustainability
transitions from developing at adequate rates to meet ambitious technological
and environmental targets [53–55]. Revisiting key notions of ‘path de-
pendency’ [56] and ‘lock in’ [20], attention has turned towards under-
standing the dynamics of the regime level in terms of strategies of incumbent
actors [57–60] (also see Johnstone et al. in this issue) and active ‘regime
resistance’ preventing or delaying transitions [18]. Given the observed sta-
bility at the regime level the destabilization of the regime through en-
dogenous and exogenous economic and political pressures has become a
recent focus in the transitions literature. An early example is the historical
analysis outlining the evolution of the destabilization of the coal regime in the
UK [13,14].
Within this context, Kivimaa and Kern argued that policy mixes for
transitions ideally “include elements of ‘creative destruction’, involving both
policies aiming for the ‘creation’ of new and for ‘destabilizing’ the old.” [10].
They have identiﬁed four entry points for such destabilization policies im-
pacting the ‘motors of creative destruction’: control policies (such as carbon
trading), signiﬁcant changes in regime rules (such as electricity market re-
form), reduced support for dominant regime technologies (such as reduced
public funding for research and development on coal (R&D)), and changes in
social networks as well as the replacement of key actors (such as the sub-
stitution of incumbents with new entrants in policy advisory councils). The
EU emission trading system (EU ETS) is one example for such a control
policy, as it establishes a carbon price signal which can help leveling the
playing ﬁeld between carbon-intensive and low-carbon alternatives. How-
ever, it has been increasingly argued that these market-based approaches
have not been suﬃcient in promoting energy transitions at the rates neces-
sary to meet ambitious climate change targets [61–63]. Given various bar-
riers, lock-ins, path dependencies and resistance to low-carbon energy tran-
sitions further government intervention in steering them is required
[4,20,64–71] (see also Bergek et al. in this issue).
‘Discontinuation’ has also been a recent interest in the governance
literature which focuses on the governance processes involved in the
active disengagement “from an on-going policy or governance com-
mitment” [16:112]. This research draws on a conceptual governance
heuristic looking at the constellations of actors, issues, and ‘windows of
opportunity’ which can lead to the rare policy moments when it be-
comes feasible for governance to enact a ban or phase out policy. The
analysis of multiple historic case studies of diﬀering technological areas
enabled a better understanding of the economic, technical, political,
and cultural drivers that enable discontinuation to be realised in par-
ticular contexts.1 Yet, while these cases are concerned with the dis-
cursive and material factors through which discontinuation policy is
realised and managed as an interactive governance process, they gen-
erally end once a policy decision has been reached.
Yet, despite being generally rare and politically challenging to enact
[15] phase out policies are becoming a growing political reality in the
context of greater urgency in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For ex-
ample, increasingly policy makers at national and the EU level are sug-
gesting that a more rapid coal phase out through more proactive govern-
mental intervention will be necessary if ambitious climate goals are to be
met [72]. Indeed, there is an emerging consensus that the use of unabated
coal generation must rapidly decline over the next decade if temperature
rises shall be stabilized at 2 °C [73]. In addition, a number of countries are
now phasing out or making plans to phase out nuclear energy, such as
Belgium, Germany, Scotland, South Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan
[21,22]. Therefore, given the contemporary relevance of destabilization
policies for energy transitions it is a question of high policy relevance to
better understand the impacts of such dedicated phase-out policies.
Yet, while there is ample evidence on the so far limited impact of
the EU ETS as a market-based control policy on low-carbon innovation
[62], there is little empirical evidence on the impact of other destabi-
lization policies, such as phasing out nuclear or coal, on technological
change in competing low-carbon technologies. To close this research
gap, in this paper we examine the case of the German Energiewende
[28–30,74], with a focus on the impact of its dedicated nuclear phase-
out policy on the development and diﬀusion of renewable energies. We
have chosen this research case because it provides one of the few ex-
amples of dedicated phase-out policies which has been in place for over
a decade and has been embedded in the context of a broader policy mix
aiming at the decarbonization of the energy system [6,75,76]. This
empirical case is relevant to emerging literatures on policy mixes par-
ticularly in relation to the eﬀects of understudied ‘ﬂip sides’ to in-
novation, and to broader European policy contexts where whether or
1 The case studies included bans on DDT [50], the phase-out of incandescent light bulbs
[105], the internal combustion engine [15] and nuclear policy in the UK and Germany
[17].
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not nuclear phase out is being implemented is becoming a crucial point
of diﬀerence between countries [77,78], yet the eﬀects such a policy
has on the development of renewable energies is under-examined.
3. Research case
For exploring the impact of phase-out policies on technological
change we use the case of the transition of the German electricity
generation system towards renewable energies – the so-called
Energiewende – with its target of reaching at least a level of 80% elec-
tricity generation by renewable energies by 2050 [29,32]. This long-
term target is supported through a rich instrument mix [33], with the
core instrument being the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG).
Introduced in 2000 the EEG established, among others, technology
speciﬁc feed-in tariﬀs guaranteed over a period of 20 years [66]. Based on
extensive monitoring and evaluation the EEG has been regularly amended
since then, leading to a number of policy changes, including the increase of
expansion targets for renewable energies and updates of feed-in tariﬀs based
on techno-economic improvements and deployment success. In addition,
unexpectedly positive developments in solar PV between 2009 and 12 led to
exceptional adjustments in the EEG, which combined with global compe-
tition caused some turmoil and consolidation of the Germany PV industry
[79,80]. The EEG reform of 2014–also dubbed as EEG 2.0–continued to
implement the government’s increased focus on cost-eﬀectiveness [81]. For
example, technology speciﬁc expansion corridors were introduced, and pi-
lots testing a system change from feed-in tariﬀs to auctions were initiated,
using open space PV as the ﬁrst example.2
Aside from the EEG also many complementary policies have been in
place for a long time, such as public R&D support, funding programs by
the German development bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau),
or grid expansion measures [33]. Together with the long-term targets
and the EEG, this rich policy mix has stimulated rapid technological
change in renewable power generation technologies [80,82,83]. This
includes the emergence of a strong renewable energy industry which
has created jobs and exports its products and services abroad [84,85].
Also, the renewable energy sector has been highly innovative, as
measured by patent applications, scientiﬁc publications or new pro-
ducts and processes [83,86]. Finally, the share of renewable based
electricity generation has increased from 3.4% in 1990–31.6% in 2016,
with faster diﬀusion rates than originally foreseen [87].
Yet, what makes the German Energiewende an ideal research case to
study the impact of destabilization policies is that the German policy mix
also includes destabilization policies. The most prominent one is Germany’s
nuclear phase-out policy until 2022 which was initially negotiated with
incumbents by the Red-Green Schroeder government and adopted in 2002.
After a short interlude in 2010/11 it was by and large reinstated by Merkel’s
conservative-liberal government in 2011 as a reaction to the Fukushima
incident. Since then, the nuclear phase-out policy has enjoyed cross-party
support, thereby sealing the fate of nuclear energy in Germany [17,31]. In
addition, the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) represents another
destabilization policy by putting a price tag on greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions of regulated sectors, including energy. However, given the large
accumulated surplus of EU allowances this EU control policy and its in-
novation impact has remained rather weak [62]. Finally, the introduction of
policies for phasing out coal and lignite has only started to be put on the
political agenda prior to the COP21 negotiations at Paris in 2015. Yet, their
implementation has been faced with signiﬁcant resistance by industry,
unions and regional policy makers, despite Germany’s gap in achieving its
2020 GHG reduction target [88]. This political deadlock in overcoming the
‘Climate Paradox’ of rising CO2 emissions from high load factors of existing
coal and lignite plants puts into question the political will of the German
government for achieving its ambitions GHG reduction target of 40% by
2020 and 80% by 2050 [89].
4. Methodology
4.1. Data collection
In order to explore the impact of destabilization policies on the devel-
opment and diﬀusion of renewable energies we draw on the results of a
survey of innovation activities of German manufacturers and suppliers in
renewable power generation technologies conducted within the
GRETCHEN project. While the details of the survey implementation are
described elsewhere [42], here we summarize some of the key points. First,
a dataset of all German companies active in the supply chain for manu-
facturing renewable power generation technologies was compiled based on
diﬀerent data sources (e.g. business directories, industry association mem-
berships, business fair catalogues), resulting in the identiﬁcation of 1092
manufacturers active in producing components, equipment and ﬁnal pro-
ducts for on- and oﬀshore wind, solar PV, hydropower, bioenergy, wave and
tidal energy, geothermal energy and concentrated solar power (as of 2013/
2014).3 Second, building on the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) con-
ducted within the EU a questionnaire was developed which speciﬁcally
included novel questions on the policy mix, in line with a broader under-
standing of the term [6] and drawing on qualitative insights on oﬀshore
wind [65]. Speciﬁcally, the survey attempted to capture policy mix char-
acteristics, such as credibility, consistency, coherence and comprehensive-
ness, but also included questions on the design features of the EEG and on
the targets for the expansion of renewable energies. Third, the innovation
survey was conducted by a specialized service provider in the summer of
2014 as a computer assisted telephone interview (CATI) with top level
management representatives. It achieved a response rate of 35.7% of all
German manufactures of renewable power generation technologies
(n = 390), including both new entrants but also incumbent players that
have redirected their activities towards emerging green niche markets.
4.2. Data analysis
In this paper, we draw on insights from descriptive statistics [90]
and combine ﬁndings from regression analyses [42,43] to explore the
impact of the nuclear phase-out policy on technological change – dif-
ferentiated in innovation and diﬀusion – in renewable energies in
Germany, as is depicted in Fig. 1. In the following, we provide a sum-
mary on these three building blocks of our explorative analysis.
First, the descriptive analysis served as basis for generating an overview
showing the composition of the sample, in terms of ﬁrm size, location and
technology portfolio, the perceptions of respondents regarding the policy
mix, their innovation activities and expenditures, and further information
[90]. As a third of the respondents were active in more than one renewable
power generation technology, respondents were asked to answer the survey
for their main technology only, which led to half of the responses referring
to solar PV (37.2%), biogas (22.3%) and onshore wind (17.4%). As is ty-
pical for the German manufacturing sector, there is a large share of small
and medium sized enterprises (ca 70% SME) and many of them sell their
products at home and abroad (on average ca 39.7% of sales in 2013 were
exports). Also in line with trends in manufacturing the large majority of the
companies had performed innovation activities in 2011–13 (ca 82%),
leading to product innovations (ca for 75% of the respondents) as well as
process innovations (ca 66%).
2 The most recent changes of the EEG in 2016 have continued this policy paradigm
change in German renewable energy policy by rolling out auctions as standard allocation
mechanism across all technologies − with exceptions being in place for small players,
such as households − and by putting a greater emphasis on remaining within the en-
visaged, rather conservative expansion corridors. Consequently, it has been argued that
the government is now favoring investments by incumbents and slowing down the
Energiewende [104], despite the large majority of Germans demanding a faster transition
towards renewables [106].
3 This number is in line with Doblinger et al. who identiﬁed 1,208 manufacturers and
project developers active in renewable energies in Germany in 2012 [107].
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Second, regression 1 aimed at answering the research question re-
garding whether policy mix characteristics matter for innovation, namely
consistency, credibility, coherence and comprehensiveness [42]. Taking
manufacturers innovation expenditures for 2014 and 2015 as a dependent
variable, and ﬁrm-external and ﬁrm-internal factors as explanatory vari-
ables, a “corner solution” bivariate Tobit model was employed to specify the
regression equation for innovation expenditures in 2014 and 2015 (using
STATA). Firm-external factors focused on the eﬀects of market demand
(measured by global sales), public support for technology push (measured
by German and European subsidies received in 2011–2013) and the eﬀects
of policy mix characteristics (as perceived by manufactures at the time of
the survey, i.e. 2014). Regarding the latter, the study diﬀerentiates between
the consistency of the policy strategy, of the instrument mix and of the
overarching policy mix; national and sub-national policy mix credibility; the
informational and procedural coherence of policy processes; and the com-
prehensiveness of the instrument mix. In terms of ﬁrm-internal factors the
study includes ﬁrm size (measured by total global sales in 2013), experience
(measured by number of years the manufacturer has been active in the main
renewable power generation technology) and technology portfolio (con-
trolling for wind power). The study ﬁnds evidence that the consistency of
the overarching policy mix and the credibility of the policy mix at the na-
tional level have a positive impact on innovation expenditures, and suggests
a strong interaction eﬀect between the two. As could have been expected
from other studies, both demand pull as well as technology push instru-
ments are positively correlated with innovation expenditures, as are ﬁrm
size, experience and technology portfolio.
Third, inspired by the ﬁndings of earlier qualitative work and regression
1 regarding the relevance of policy mix credibility – i.e. the reliability and
believability of the policy mix – regression 2 sets out to investigate the
determinants of this credibility [43], thereby also aiming to shed more light
on the links with other policy mix characteristics, in particular consistency.
The dependent variable ‘credibility’ was created through conducting an
exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation for seven credibility items
which ultimately enabled the construction of an internally consistent scale
aggregating four of these items.4 The explanatory variables for the linear
regression (performed with SPSS) included other characteristics and ele-
ments of the policy mix. Regarding the former, and similarly to regression 1,
the study diﬀerentiates between the consistency of the policy strategy, of
the instrument mix and of the overarching policy mix; the informational
and procedural coherence of policy processes; and the comprehensiveness
of the instrument mix. Regarding the latter, the study distinguishes between
the policy strategy (focusing on (the reduction of) the ambitiousness of the
target for renewable energies), eight policy instruments (including two
destabilization policies, namely the nuclear phase-out and the EU ETS, see
Fig. 5), and the design features of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG).
The study ﬁnds that manufacturers’ perceptions on the nuclear phase out
add signiﬁcantly to explaining the variance in perceived policy mix cred-
ibility. In addition, there is also strong evidence that the adopted changes in
the EEG design features had a negative impact on credibility. Furthermore,
the study conﬁrms a positive correlation between credibility and con-
sistency as well as with the coherence of policy processes– both regarding
informational and procedural coherence of policy processes.
4.3. Combination of analysis
In this paper, we are combining the insights from these three analyses to
explore the link between destabilization policies and technological change.
In a ﬁrst step we explore the innovation impact by combining insights from
the assessments of companies regarding the impact of various aspects of the
policy mix [90] with insights from both regression analyses 1 [42] and 2
[43]. In a second step, we explore the impact of destabilization policies on
the diﬀusion of renewable energies by drawing on the direct assessments of
companies regarding the expected impact of various policy instruments –
including the nuclear phase-out – on the future expansion of renewable
energies [90]. Clearly, this analysis is not free from limitations and results
should thus be interpreted with caution. Aside from the limitations outlined
in the separate papers for regression analyses 1 [42] and 2 [43], we want to
particularly emphasize that our explorative analysis cannot reveal causal
explanations but at best only provides correlations. Also, while both re-
gressions are suﬃciently distinct and can be logically combined, some
overlaps regarding policy mix characteristics remain. We argue, however,
that this ﬁrst empirical exploration into the link between destabilization
policies, and in particular the ﬁndings regarding the relevance of the nu-
clear phase-out, provide some important insights for policy makers inter-
ested in creative destruction as well as directions for future research.
5. Results
In this section we investigate the link between destabilization policies
and technological change by ﬁrst exploring the impact of the German nu-
clear phase-out and other destabilization policies on innovation in renew-
able energies, and then turn to their impact on diﬀusion.
5.1. Impact on innovation
Exploring the innovation impact of the German nuclear phase-out policy
is not straightforward, as this policy has not been included in a direct ques-
tion on the link between policy and innovation, but only the EU ETS as
another destabilization policy. More precisely, innovating manufactures were
asked to assess the inﬂuence of diﬀerent aspects of the policy mix for their
innovation activities in the period 2011–13 (see Fig. 2). The results show that
domestic and foreign demand pull instruments are seen as most inﬂuential
elements of the policy mix – both today‘s and expected future demand pull
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of combination of descriptive and regression
analysis.
Note: Sources of analysis: descriptive statistics [90], regression 1 [42],
regression 2 [43]; the ‘policy mix box’ includes, among others, the nuclear
phase-out, policy mix characteristics other than policy mix credibility
(which is highlighted in its own box), the EEG and its design features.
4 These four items included: Concerning the increase of electricity generation from
renewable energies in Germany, there is (1) a clear political vision, (2) a ﬁrm political
will, (3) unambiguous political signals and (4) strong support from the German govern-
ment.
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instruments – which is in line with ﬁndings of the eco-innovation literature
[91–94]. However, the ﬁndings also show that the renewable expansion
targets for the year 2025 and a credible commitment to the Energiewende is
seen as almost equally important aspects of the policy mix. Interestingly,
these demand pull instruments and the policy strategy with its long-term
target were viewed as more important than German and EU R&D support for
renewable energies – which had been received by roughly a quarter of re-
spondents [90]. As could have been expected from earlier studies [62], the
EU ETS was deemed as the least relevant political factor for determining
companies’ innovation activities. Finally, to contrast the importance of poli-
tical factors with the importance assigned to market factors companies were
also asked about the inﬂuence of the demand for innovations from their
customers, which was seen as themost inﬂuential factor, thereby highlighting
that in the supplier driven electricity sector the policy mix drives innovation
by inﬂuencing demand.
Manufactures who had no innovation activities in the period
2011–13 were asked a similar question about the inﬂuence of the above
mentioned political factors on their decision not to pursue any in-
novation activities in renewable energies in that period. As can be seen
in Fig. 3, what non-innovators missed most was a credible political
commitment to the Energiewende, further underlining the relevance of
policy mix credibility for stimulating innovation. They also criticized
the insuﬃcient support under the German Renewable Energy Sources
Act (EEG). In contrast, the lack of demand for innovations from
customers and unfavorable foreign support were seen as the lowest
obstacles to innovation, while the lack of incentives from the EU ETS
ranged in the middle ﬁeld.
Given that a credible political commitment to the Energiewende (or
perceived lack thereof) was among the top 2 most inﬂuential political
factors in determining companies’ innovation activities, in the fol-
lowing we take a closer look at the development of this perceived
policy mix credibility, and then turn to its determinants – which will
eventually lead us to destabilization policies, and in particular to the
nuclear phase-out. As can be seen in Fig. 4, manufacturers were most
aware of the political will to promote power generation from re-
newable energies at the time of the nuclear phase-out reinstitution
after Fukushima (2011/12). However, companies think this cred-
ibility of the policy mix supporting renewable energies has ebbed
away since then and expect it to stabilize at a fairly low level with the
2014 amendment of the EEG .5
Fig. 2. Company assessment of inﬂuence of policy mix on innovation (ranked by strength).
Source: [90]
Fig. 3. Company assessment of inﬂuence of policy mix on decision not to innovate.
Source: [90]
5 Because it may be quite diﬃcult to accurately remember the perceived strength of the
political will, with the situation today potentially blurring past perceptions, this concern
was alleviated by asking respondents about perceptions at key points in time (events or
issues which had been heavily debated and covered in the media back then, such as the
nuclear phase-out after Fukushima or discussions initiated by the former ministers for the
environment and the economy on an electricity price brake).
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Given the indicated relevance of credibility for companies’ innova-
tion activities Rogge and Schleich included a variable measuring the
perceived credibility of the policy mix in 2014 in their regression
analysis [42]. This credibility variable distinguishes between the na-
tional and sub-national levels, and draws on companies’ assessments of
diﬀerent items at the time of the survey (2014). The regression analysis,
which also includes variables for technology push and demand pull
instruments (both signiﬁcant) as well as other characteristics of the
policy mix (only its consistency is signiﬁcant), indicates that those
companies which view the policy mix at a national level as more
credible invest more in R&D in renewable energies. However, the
analysis also shows a strong interaction eﬀect between the overarching
consistency of the policy mix and credibility at the national level.6
Given that policy mix credibility seems to be a potentially important
determinant for companies’ innovation activities and expenditures,
Rogge and Duetschke investigated the reasons why companies belief (or
not) in the policy mix, i.e. what determines the diﬀerent perceptions
about the strength of the political will of the German government in
promoting the expansion of renewable energies [43]. They ﬁnd that,
among others, the changes in the design of the German EEG negatively
impact on the perceived credibility of the policy mix. Regarding other
policy instruments they ﬁnd strong evidence that the perception of the
nuclear phase-out policy (on which almost all manufacturers had an
opinion) matters for explaining perceived policy mix credibility. They
also ﬁnd, albeit weak evidence that the EU Emission Trading System
may potentially be positively correlated with credibility. This shows
that the implementation of destabilization policies positively con-
tributes to companies’ perceptions of the credibility of the policy mix,
but depends on their stringency. This in turn leads to higher invest-
ments in corporate R&D in renewable energies, thereby suggesting an
indirect link between destabilization policies – at least in the form of
the nuclear phase-out in Germany – and low-carbon innovation. How-
ever, this link is not a direct one but seems to operate through its in-
ﬂuence on the credibility of the policy mix, which in turn seems to
matter for innovation.
5.2. Impact on diﬀusion
After establishing that destabilization policies – at least in the case
of the German nuclear phase-out policy –may positively impact on low-
carbon innovation, we now turn to the question whether such policies
might also have an impact on the diﬀusion of renewable power gen-
eration technologies. To answer this question, we draw on the assess-
ments of the surveyed manufacturers regarding their support for the
expansion of renewable electricity generation (see Fig. 5).7 Interest-
ingly, German-based manufacturers believe the nuclear phase-out oﬀers
the strongest support for the diﬀusion of renewable energies – with the
EEG, R&D support and training programs coming in second place. In
contrast, the EU Emission Trading System hardly seems to have any
eﬀect. The same holds for the framework conditions for fossil power
generation technologies, where no speciﬁc phase-out policy was in
place at the time of the survey .
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have explored whether the German nuclear phase-
out policy originally introduced in 2002 and – after a short interlude in
Fig. 4. Perceived political will of the German government regarding expansion of re-
newable energies (n = 368).
Source: [90]
Fig. 5. Company assessment of impact of policy instruments on diﬀusion of renewable energies.
Note: Respondents were asked to assess the instruments in the following order: EEG, R&D funding, EnWG/grid, training, nature conservation, EU ETS, fossils, nuclear phase out.
Source: [90]
6 In the full model which combines all policy mix characteristics as well as further ﬁrm-
external and ﬁrm-internal factors, only policy mix consistency and its interaction eﬀect
with credibility at the national level remain statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting the need
for larger sample sizes and investigations into the links between consistency and cred-
ibility.
7 Please note that companies could refrain from assessing any instrument – either be-
cause they did not want to provide information or because they did not know the answer.
For simplicity and clarity, here we have only provided the responses of those who pro-
vided an assessment of the impact of an instrument – which is why the number of re-
sponses per instrument vaies. For example, while all but ﬁve companies had an opinion
(and voiced it) on the impact of the nuclear phase-out (which, incidentally, was asked as
last instrument in the list of these eight policies), whereas the impact of the Energy
Industry Act and the Federal Nature Conservation Act was not answered by 81 and 89
manufacturers, respectively, mainly because they felt they did not know this.
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2010/11–reinstated in 2011 has had an impact on the development and
diﬀusion of renewable power generation technologies. To answer this
question we have drawn on insights gained from an innovation survey
conducted among German manufacturers and suppliers in renewable
power generation technologies. We found that in 2014 manufacturers
believed the nuclear phase-out oﬀers the strongest support for the fu-
ture diﬀusion of renewable energies. That is, while the EEG remains
important for future markets, the manufacturers expect that their future
sales will be most positively inﬂuenced by the nuclear phase-out policy
which oﬀers a clear decarbonization trajectory build on renewable
energies. In contrast, the EU Emission Trading System – another de-
stabilization policy – hardly seems to have had any eﬀect, which, given
its low allowance prices, is hardly surprising and in line with previous
studies pointing to the importance of the instrument’s stringency.
Manufactures also did not think that the framework conditions for fossil
power generation technologies would have a positive impact on the
future expansion of renewable energies, which may be hardly sur-
prising given that they did not foresee any speciﬁc phase-out policy at
the time of the survey in 2014.
Regarding the impact of the nuclear phase-out policy on innovation,
we ﬁnd a positive link, which seems to materialize through the eﬀect of
the existence of this policy on the overall credibility of the German
policy mix for renewable energies. The ﬁndings suggest that manu-
facturers were most keenly aware of the political will to promote power
generation from renewable energies at the time of the nuclear phase-
out after Fukushima. However, companies think that the credibility of
the policy mix has ebbed away since then. This is important given that
credibility was regarded by companies as being almost as important a
factor for determining their innovation activities as the political ex-
pansion targets, the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and
comparable foreign demand pull instruments. The EU Emission Trading
System on the other hand, played hardly any role. This matters because
regression analysis indicates that those companies which view the
policy mix as more credible invest more in R&D for renewable energies.
Importantly, it is not only the changes in the design of the German feed-
in tariﬀs for renewable energies and other EEG design features that
determine the perceived credibility of the policy mix, but also the nu-
clear phase-out as the only other policy instrument which had a
strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect. That is, this destabilization policy is shown
to positively contribute to companies’ perceptions of the credibility of
the overarching policy mix. And this, in turn, seems to lead to higher
investments in corporate R&D in renewable energies, therefore high-
lighting that the nuclear phase-out policy may also have had a positive
innovation impact on these competing low-carbon technologies.
Our explorative analysis contributes to literatures on destabilization
and discontinuation which are furthering work in innovation studies
related to the understudied ‘ﬂip sides’ to innovation [14]. So far, at-
tention towards destabilization has focused on how particular socio
technical regimes become weakened through technical, economic and
political pressures, as suggested by the historical case study of UK coal
[13,14]. In addition, recent research on discontinuation has taken a
governance perspective in order to understand how it becomes politi-
cally feasible to enact policies directed at the discontinuation of certain
technological pathways. Yet, while these approaches have contributed
to understanding the policy process around discontinuation and de-
stabilization, what the eﬀects of discontinuation policies are for socio-
technical change have not been studied. While it has been noted that
“…the deliberate destabilization and decline of fossil fuel based in-
dustries may play a productive role in sustainability transitions, be-
cause it would create more space for renewables” [14:36], this had not
been veriﬁed through empirical research. Drawing on empirical data,
this paper demonstrates more clearly the eﬀect that the nuclear phase-
out policy seems to have in terms of technological change in renewable
energies in Germany. These explorative insights contribute to broader
understandings of the implications that discontinuation policies have
on innovation, thereby addressing a key research gap. In summary, this
paper diﬀers from previous research on discontinuation and destabili-
zation in two ways: ﬁrst, it analyses a current and ongoing dis-
continuation policy rather than a historical case study, and second,
rather than focusing on the policy process and governance has studied
discontinuation from the perspective of how such policies inﬂuence the
broader policy mix and technological change.
Although the role of nuclear in low carbon transitions remains
contested in terms of the ‘actual sustainability’ of nuclear [95], it is
clear that following Fukushima, a number of countries are considering
phasing out the technology [96]. In Europe for example, the UK’s am-
bitious nuclear new build agenda is actually the exceptional case, with
minimal new build taking place elsewhere [97]. It is not just Germany,
but also Belgium, Switzerland, and Scotland that are planning to phase
out nuclear, while in Sweden, Spain, and the Netherlands, phase out
currently looks more likely than nuclear new build [37]. Further aﬁeld,
Taiwan is also implementing a nuclear phase out policy [98], and most
recently South Korea has also signaled the intention to end the use of
nuclear power [21]. For countries making such decisions, the positive
eﬀect perceived by renewable manufacturers of a phase out policy
should be taken note of, but the range of policies that Germany has in
place to also support renewables (like the Renewable Energy Sources
Act and strong R&D support) is also important, as is the consistency of
this policy mix. Germany had implemented signiﬁcant long-term sup-
port mechanisms prior to the ﬁnal phase out decision after Fukushima,
so other countries looking to phase out nuclear should also consider the
broader policy mix in terms of whether suﬃcient instruments are in
place to promote the growth of technological alternatives in the form of
renewables and energy eﬃciency.
This research also has relevance for coal phase out policies. A key
challenge over the next decade that has been recognized is the need to
phase out coal in order to promote more rapid transitions in order to
meet climate change targets [73,99]. For example, the UK has an-
nounced a coal phase out by 2025 [72], and the Netherlands have also
passed initial laws to phase out the ﬁve remaining coal plants in op-
eration in the country [26]. The insights generated from this research
may be useful in understanding what the impacts of coal phase out may
be on renewables industries. Our research suggests that removing coal
may also yield positive results for the development and diﬀusion of low-
carbon technologies. However, again, the exceptional nature of the
German case must be pointed out in terms of the long-term commitment
to a renewables future envisaged in the Energiewende, as well as the
nature of German politics to intervene more readily in markets [100].
This implies that countries pursuing coal phase out policies may be well
advised to embed these into a broader policy mix with ambitious long-
term targets and a supporting instrument mix consisting of both de-
stabilization and creation policies, but also to enhance the procedural
and informational coherence of policy making and implementation.
Finally, should Germany eventually overcome the strong resistance of
incumbents to implement a coal phase-out – as strongly suggested by
think tanks and environmental NGOs [88,101] – we would assume that
such a coal phase-out would not only reduce CO2 emissions but could
also – similarly to the nuclear phase-out policy – yield a positive impact
on the diﬀusion and innovation of low-carbon solutions for a renew-
ables based energy system. In this sense, by creating space in future
markets destabilization policies would perhaps best be seen as ‘trans-
formative’ demand pull instruments to be added to the policy mix to
accelerate transition processes.
In addition, this paper speaks to building understandings of the role
of destabilization and discontinuity in sustainability transitions more
generally, a hitherto under-researched aspect of transitions studies
[18]. It adds to previous research on destabilization and discontinuity
in technological systems [15–17,50] by highlighting the impacts that
discontinuation policies may have on the broader energy sector once
they are implemented. The credibility and importance of the phase out
policy for manufacturers in the renewables sector in Germany gives
some indication of how policies aimed at the regime level and niche-
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supporting policies interact within a policy mix. Such niche-regime
interactions are an area requiring more attention [19,102]. In parti-
cular, research in sustainability transitions has recently tried to un-
derstand how processes of niche protection and empowerment can be
achieved [11,103]. Despite turbulence in the German energy transition
and on-going political debates [81,104], nuclear phase-out appears to
play a key role in cementing the credibility to the overall policy mix,
enabling certainty in the face of challenging market conditions. As such,
the German nuclear phase-out could be encapsulated as a process that
assists in protecting, empowering and shielding niche developments
through companies’ conﬁdence remaining high due in part to the clear
overall direction of the German energy transition which the nuclear
phase out makes clear.
Our study is not free from limitations. First, it only represents a ﬁrst
empirical exploration of the link between destabilization policies and
technological change in renewable energies as low-carbon alternatives.
Second, its data is limited by only covering one country, one point in
time and only one type of actor. It should therefore be interpreted with
caution and rather be seen as a stepping-stone towards future research
on discontinuation and destabilization policies.
Future research could look at other phase out policies in terms of the
ways in which they strengthen (or hinder) commitments towards niche
developments in sustainability transitions, analyzing the relationship
more directly and could do so from the perspective of diﬀerent actors.
This requires the explicit consideration of phase out policies in a study’s
design from the outset – not only regarding their impact on diﬀusion
but also regarding their impact on innovation.
In conclusion, this paper has provided quantitative evidence gath-
ered among German manufacturers of renewable power generation
technologies that the German nuclear phase-out policy may positively
impact technological change in renewable energies. As such, future
policy eﬀorts should pay much greater attention to devising feasible
strategies for adopting such destabilization policies despite the like-
lihood of signiﬁcant resistance of incumbents.
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